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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STRATEGIC THINKING PROCESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN) MILITARY

BY

BRIGADIER GENERAL SHEAU-JUNG LU
The Republic of China (Taiwan) Army

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ABSTRACT

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This paper introduces the strategic thinking process of the Republic of China (R.O.C.) military. It elaborates on divisions of strategic levels, and how the thinking process works in R.O.C. (Taiwan) military. The paper will focus on the strategic level of warfare. In addition, it will apply the R.O.C. (Taiwan) thinking process to historical examples of war, in order to exemplify the divergent thinking process of the US and R.O.C. (Taiwan). After comparing and contrasting, it will propose some personal recommendations for enhancing and improving the thinking process.

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An Introduction to the Strategic Thinking Process of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Military

I. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to search for a more effective approach of the strategic thinking process. The paper begins from the depictions of thinking process, then describes the strategic thinking process of the Republic of China (R.O.C.) military. A detailed contrast of the thinking process between the U.S. and R.O.C. military will be provided. In this section, two important events in World War II will be used as examples. Finally, some personal opinions regarding the strategic thinking process will be presented.

This research is based on an extensive review of literature sources and applies personal experience to analyze the thinking process. This paper will solely focus on specific perceptions at the strategic level of warfare.

II. Depicting to Thinking Process

A. What is thinking and its process?

John Dewey described thinking in his book <u>How We Think</u> as "the stream of consciousness" and "some thing is going through our head, the name of this uncontrolled coursing of ideas is thinking¹." John Chaffee's book, <u>Thinking Critically</u> claimed "thinking is an active, purposeful, organized

process that we use to make sense of the world²." These two different definitions revealed that thinking itself may be either regular/irregular, systematic/chaotic, and realistic/fantastic. Therefore, if we could organize thinking with an orderly process, it will become purposeful for solving problems or making decisions.

B. Why is thinking process important?

Using the thinking process as a framework, it can help us to understand problems and seek the solutions for solving problems. Additionally, it can largely influence the quality and efficiency of our solutions and decisions.

A well organized thinking process may help us to clearly define our objective, adequately consider relative factors and precisely evaluate course of actions. We then could assure that the 'Ways (Concepts)' and 'Ends (Objectives)³¹ are accurately connected together.

C. How should we formulate thinking process?

No single thinking process can fit all problems. Different professions at different levels need different thinking processes. A significant and complex issue should be dealt with a prudent, foresighted and integrated procedure. High level (strategic) thinking usually focuses on long-run interests, while low level (tactical and technical) thinking emphasizes immediate interests and

benefits.

We should formulate distinct thinking processes with logical procedure and ask a series of questions in each step. These questions act as a directive to help us consider relevant factors. When applying a thinking process, we should not be restricted by its format, in order to maintain flexibility and creativity.

III. Strategic Thinking Process of The R.O.C. Military

Every country has its own strategic thinking process. The rationale of these thinking processes might be very similar, but because of different political and military circumstances, every country may generate unique approaches. The distinctions among various thinking processes usually cause different conclusions and result in different strategic actions.

Based on the R.O.C. military doctrine⁴ strategy has five levels, which include Grand, National, Military, Service, and Field strategies. Each level serves a different purpose and has different thinking process or points to consider. This review introduces the definition and thinking process of each strategic level.

A. Grand Strategy

Grand strategy aims at the establishment of Allies (Coalition) power/

strength, and the art of creating and applying advantageous situations, in order to gain the greatest odds and favorable effect when pursuing Allies' (Coalition's) objective.

In 1979, the U.S. severed relations with the R.O.C. Since then, the R.O.C. did not have a military coalition or ally. Therefore, it has been a long time since the R.O.C. employed this strategic level. With the absence of recent example, this paper will not address Grand strategy thinking of the R.O.C.

B. National strategy

National strategy aims at building national power/strength and involves the art of creating and applying advantageous situations in order to gain the greatest odds and favorable effect when pursuing national objectives. National strategy includes political, economic, psychological, and military strategies.

National strategy defines national objectives and guide decisions on the use armed forces to achieve these objectives. It should first identify the vital and important interests of the country and what factor(s) will challenge these interests. National strategy then may further establish policies to direct subordinate strategies. The essentials of the National strategy thinking process are summarized as the following table.

Process	Focus	Points to Consider	
Strategic Environment Assessment	situation National interests and threats	What are the advantageous and detrimental situations? What are the vital interests, and what factors will challenge them? Who are the opponent(s)? Who much resources could be used for protecting these interests?	
Objective Determination	™Objectives ™Measures ™Agenda	What are the objectives for achieving national interests? How to accomplish these objectives, and what are the favorable outcomes and decisive points? What actions should be taken, and when should these objectives be achieved?	
Strategic Estimate	Course of action Analyzing and comparing Decision	What are the advantages and disadvantages of these course of actions? Which one is the most optimal course of action?	
Implement Directive	Subordinate goals and strategies	■ What are the specific goals/missions of subordinates? ■ How to assure the strategies of subordinates are consistent with national strategy?	

C. Military (Service) strategy

Military strategy aims at the establishment of armed (Service) forces and the art of creating and using advantageous situations to support national (military) strategy, in order to gain the greatest odds and favorable effects when pursuing campaign objectives or conduct decisive operations.

Military (Service) strategy defines force structure and applies defense resources. According to the views of future warfighting, military (Service)

strategy should first examine whether the current doctrines are adequate for future war. Then it considers how to streamline forces structure to match future doctrines of war and proportions resources to accomplish its objectives. The essentials of Military (Service) level thinking process are summarized as the following table.

Process	Focus	Points to Consider
Strategic Environment Assessment	□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □	What are the defense missions for carrying out national goals? What are the possibilities of war? What would be the characteristics of this war? What are the requirements of preparation for future war? How much resources (budget, manpower, tech) could be used? What are the limitations or constraints?
Mission Analysis	■Objectives ■Measures	What are the objectives for fulfilling defense missions? How to prepare the capabilities for future war?
Overall Directive	■ Direction Priorities Coordination	what are the policies for establishing future forces and deploying defense resources? What are their priorities? What are the policies for establishing future forces and deploying defense resources? What are their priorities?
Strategic Research	™Method ™Doctrines Forces design ™Test and evaluation ™Recommendation	What is the appropriate method for this research? What are the theories and doctrines for future warfighting? How to design future forces structure? How to evaluate the effectiveness of future forces? What will be the most optimal future forces?
Implement Directive	Resources proportion Training	■ How to allot available resources most efficiently? ■ How to enhance the combat abilities of future forces?

D. Field strategy

Field strategy is the application of armed forces and the art of creating and applying advantageous situations to supporting military strategy, in order to gain the greatest odds and favorable effects when pursuing strategic objective or conduct decisive operation. Field strategy includes Army, Naval, and Air Force operational strategies and other operational strategies of independent systems.

Field strategy guides the deployment of armed forces at the best time and position. It emphasizes on how to seize and keep strategic initiative throughout the duration of war. The essentials of Field strategy thinking process are summarized as the following table.

Process	Focus	Points to Consider	
Strategic Environment Assessment	Strategic situation Initiative Battlefield	What are the superior and inferior factors of strategic situation? What are the crucial points for gaining strategic initiative? What are the aspects of battlefield?	
Mission Analysis	■Purposes ■Significance ■Forces requirement ■Strategic advantage		

Overall Directive	Favorable outcome Available assets and time Cooperation Information	What are the favorable outcomes of this war/operation? What resources could be used and when should mission be accomplished? What are the decisive factors for winning this war/operation? How to synchronize the actions of subordinate units? What is the most important information?
Strategic Estimate	™Mission Situation Course of actions (COAs) analysis COAs comparison Decision	What are the specific goals of this mission? What are the limitations and vulnerabilities of this mission? What future situation will evolve? What will happen after these course of actions are conducted? What are the advantages and disadvantages of these courses of action? Which course of action is the most optimal, should it be modified?
Planning	™Concept ™feasibility	**How to implement the decision? **Are all plans applicable and can they match one another?
Subsequent Judgement	™The evolution of situation ™New objective	■ Does the situation evolve as expected? Should it change or modify the decision/plan? ■ What will be new missions?

E. Contrast with the U.S. campaign planning process

Having introduced the thinking process of the R.O.C., this assessment will contrast the thinking processes with the U.S. When searching for the U.S. thinking process from military doctrine and publications, it is difficult to find any standard strategic thinking process. However, the U.S. military planning processes represent very logical thinking processes. These planning processes include campaign, deliberate and crisis action planning. A study of

Campaign Planning reveals "Campaign plan provides an orderly schedule of strategic military decisions." and "The Third U.S. Army is the only Army headquarters which uses all the steps in the concept and plan development phases of the deliberate planning process⁵." In order to contrast the R.O.C. and U.S. strategic planning process, the following format⁶ is helpful.

The R.O.C. on Taiwan		The United States Army	
Process	Focus	Process	Consideration
Strategic National Level: Environment Global/Domestic Assessment situation Filterests and threats	Forecast to Determine Probable Requirements	Strategic and Operational Objectives Definition of success Threat Logistic Considerations	
	Military/Services Level Future warfighting view Requirements Resources Limitations Field Level: Strategic situation Battlefield	Strategic Probable Requirements to Establish Priorities for Further Preparation	■Further Refined Objectives ■Threat ■Logistic Considerations
		Develop Assumed Mission, Course of Action (C/A)	■ Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Previous Plans Previous Analysis Personnel Conversation with CINC
Mission Analysis	■ Purposes Significance Forces requirement Strategic advantage	Mission Analysis	Tasking/Mission Threat Forces Available Terrain and Weather Constraints/Limitations

Overall Directive	■ Favorable outcome ■ Available assets and time ■ Decisive factors ■ Information	Planning Guidance	■ Initial Guidance Staff Analysis Assumptions Tentative C/A Planning Directive
Strategic Estimate	SMission Situation Course of action analyzing Course of action	Staff Estimate	■ Important Terrain/Hydrography ■ Enemy Capability ■ Available Forces/Logistic Support ■ Deploy Constraint ■ Political Considerations
	comparing	Commander's Estimate	■ Mission Situation and C/A Analyze Opposing Actions Compare our Course of Actions
Campaign Planning	■ Concept Feasibility and Integration	Planning Guidance	■ Deploy/Employ/Support, Allocation of Forces ■ Major Objectives and Target Dates for Employment
		Plan Development	Personnel Sustaining Supplies Supply Buildup, Resupply Civil, Engineering and Medical Support Resolve Shortfalls

Considering this contrast, these two thinking processes have very similar procedures. However focus/consideration points are partially different, and several of the same points are taken in different steps. The U.S. planning (thinking) process is very prudent and organized with a very clear step by step procedure. The R.O.C. also has logical thinking process to deal with

strategic problems.

IV. Exemplification of Military Strategic Thinking Process

In order to illustrate how the thinking process may influence a strategic decision, consider two historical examples of World War II to show how decisions were made. To provide a contrast, R.O.C. thinking process will be applied to derive another decision based on the same conditions. This comparison in no way implies which thinking process is better, it is purely a theoretical study and illustrates different thinking process.

Example: World War II

A. Background:

In World War II, after several years costly and bloody fighting, the Allies eventually defeated the Axis power. The United States committed massive forces in the war and became the most important pillar of the Allies. During this war, the Allies had made eight significant strategic decisions⁷. Among these decisions, the seventh (Cross Channel Attack) was the most controversial decision, and the eighth decision (An Invasion of the Japanese Homeland) influenced the fate of R.O.C. Therefore, these two decisions will serve as the basis for thinking process comparison.

1. The seventh decision - "Cross-Channel Attack"

This decision was made after a intense debate and contestable process.

The most significant argument in the decision-making process was whether the Allies should conduct the offensive operation to invade Europe across the English Channel or from the Mediterranean Sea.

Before the end of 1941, the British Joint Planners had drawn up an invasion plan, called ROUNDUP⁸. Nevertheless, at the ARCADIA Conference in Washington on 31 December 1941, both the President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister Churchill were attracted by the idea of an Allied liberation and occupation of North-West Africa⁹ (GYMNAST). While the British Chiefs of Staff wholeheartedly pushed the operations in the Mediterranean¹⁰, the American military, however, was reluctant with this plan¹¹ and insisted that the main Allied effort against Germany should take the form of a landing on the French Channel coast¹². The Soviet Union suggested a "second front" somewhere in Balkans or France, and even invited British Army into Russia territory in September 1941¹³. However, at the Tehran meeting, Marshal Stalin turned to support launching attack against Germany in northwest France¹⁴.

The long debate between U.S. and British leaders over the strategy of European war reached a climax and turning point at conferences at Cairo and Tehran¹⁵. Under the considerable urging by Stalin, the U.S. got the

decision of cross-Channel attack¹⁶. The American perspective of insisting this strategy are concluded as following:

- a. This plan (ROUNDUP/OVERLORD) would concentrate the Allied resources where they could be effectively delivered; and the U.S. desired to knock out Germany at the earliest possible date. This offensive was also an attack from a secure base at the end of America's shortest line of supply¹⁷.
- b. The summer of 1942 would be a most critical time for Russia. The threat of an attack on the Germans would have the effect of giving Hitler two fronts to fight, in order to draw off large portions of the German Army and Air Force from the Russian front¹⁸.
- c. For the U.S., the Mediterranean was an indecisive theater, there was neither a theater of war suitable for great armies, nor was there shipping to transport them¹⁹. The American suspected the Mediterranean would only serve British long-range political ends²⁰.
- 2. The eighth decision "An Invasion of the Japanese Homeland"

 This decision was made at Yalta Conference in February 1945. In

 contrast with the seventh decision, it was less controversial, but this decision

 was very important for the Asian situation in the post war period.

While the Soviet counterattack against Germans became fiercer, Stalin's armies also simultaneously surged into Eastern and some Central European

states. He wasted no time using the military power to convert these states into Communist satellites. His ambitions and expectations became so manifest and formidable. At Yalta, he further stated that the price of Soviet joining the war against Japan was to be paid by China²¹.

Before the end of 1944, the U.S. began to bomb Tokyo, disabled the Japanese fleet, and cut off all of Japan's lines of supply. Although the war against Japan in the Pacific became obviously bright, some of the U.S. strategists still believed that invasion of Japanese homeland was unavoidable, and it would cost an intolerable amount of American lives. This belief led the U.S. toward the decision on the sacrifice of China, in order to earn USSR's assistance against Japan in Northeast Asia.

B. Apply the thinking process of the R.O.C. to the U.S. strategy
In the two cases given above, if the national level thinking process of
R.O.C. was employed to simulate the U.S. strategic decisions, there would
be differences in the strategic environment assessment, objectives
determination, courses of action evaluation and final decisions.

- 1. The decision of "Cross Channel Attack":
- a. Strategic environment assessment (based on the situation at the end of 1941): In a R.O.C. perspective would have produced different views of

the global situation, national interests, threats, and national power.

(I) The global situation:

The German armies had a great superiority in Europe and relative superiority in Mediterranean. Although the Germans offensive in Russia reached a stalemate, the Red Army seemed unlikely to resist a new offensive in next summer. If Germany could conquer Russia and Egypt, her power would extend into both East Asia and Middle East. Japan had a slight naval superiority in the Pacific Ocean and a relative ground superiority in Southeast Asian countries. Japanese armies occupied the bulk of China, and were thrusting into Southeast Asia very rapidly. Once Germany and Japan reached a rendezvous in Northeast Asia or Middle East, the Allies would totally lose the strategic initiative and have no chance of success to defeat Axis.

(II) National interests and threats:

The vital national interests of U.S. would be a peaceful and stable world, enabling U.S. power to easily and freely access the resources in the world. However, collapses of Russia and North Africa might cause the rendezvous of Axis in these areas. It would be the worst strategic situation for the Allies. Furthermore, if Russia, North African countries and China could contain large quantities of Axis forces, their value remaining in the

war effort would be an extremely important interest to the U.S. and the entire Alliance.

On one hand, the Axis seriously threatened the U.S. vital interests. Among these three countries Germany was the dominant member, whose defeat would lead an overall breakdown of the Axis; On the other hand, the expansionism of communism would cause the U.S.S.R. to be a great potential threat of the U.S. In sum, the Axis was the Number One threat and Russia would be the Number Two threat of the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. needed a strategy of "two birds with one stone". It meant to defeat Axis first and to prevent the Soviet Union's expansion at the same time.

(III) National power:

The U.S. had immense potential of war, but it still needed at least one year to be mobilized. So the earliest attack on the main body of Axis would not take place before the spring of 1943. Nonetheless, the U.S. needed immediate actions to relieve the current risk. Therefore, the most important consideration of U.S. strategy, was to determine how to effectively deploy the available national power.

b. Objectives determination: from a R.O.C. perspective would reflect a different approach. According to the 'strategic environment assessment', the U.S. long-term objective should be maintaining the peace of whole world.

Intermediate objectives would include defeating Axis and preventing the U.S.S.R.'s expansion. Additionally, from the intermediate objectives the R.O.C. thinking process might derive and prioritize objectives in the following manner.

- (I) The U.S. (Allies) should give Russia and China immediate assistance, for the purpose of keeping them in war. The measures for achieving this objective would include: conduct an immediate offensive by the use of available forces, so as to divert large portion of German forces from the Russian front; supply China large amount of war materiel, in order to let her continually fight against Japan.
- (II) The U.S. (and Allies) should keep the Axis in a divided condition and endeavor to cripple their strength, in order to gain the strategic initiative and develop a favorable situation for the decisive battle. The measures for achieving this objective would include: reinforce North Africa promptly and annihilate the German armies in this region; destroy the weakest Axis country-Italy first, and eliminate her from the war.
- (III) The U.S. (and Allies) should launch decisive offensives to defeat Germany and Japan sequentially. The attack on Germany should be conducted early after the defeat of Italy, and from wherever was applicable. In addition, the favorable outcome would be the smashing of Germany's

will, consequently leading her collapse. Once Germany was defeated, the Allied forces should swiftly reorient to attack Japan.

(IV) The West Allies should prevent Russia's occupation of her adjacent countries. The limitation of Red Army out off Russian territory, therefore, would be a significant criterion for evaluating the Allied course of actions.

c. Course of actions (COAs) evaluation:

From a R.O.C. perspective would vary from the U.S. approach. For the offensive into Germany, the Allies might have three COAs: (1) from French coast, (2) from Mediterranean (Italy), and (3) from Russian territory three COAs. These COAs could be evaluated as follows:

COA-1 directly fought against enemy's main forces. If this offensive could be successful, it would have decisive strategic effect. This COA would attack the strongest portion of German occupied area. The preparation should be very difficult and complex, as well as need to concentrate considerable forces. Consequently it could not be conducted before 1943, and the Allies would take a very high risk of Russia's collapse. In addition, for the purpose of concentrating adequate forces to conduct this COA, the Allies might be limited in the capabilities to reinforce Mediterranean theater of operations. This limitation also might result the loss of North Africa. Both Russia's

collapse and the loss of North Africa might cause an overall defeat of the Allies. Furthermore, the warfighting area of this COA would be far from the Russian border, it had to take a very long time to rendezvous with Red Army. The Russian power would definitely flood into East European countries, and this should be a very unfavorable situation of post war.

COA-2 attacked the relative weak point of enemy's front, it could be conducted as early as possible. Moreover, the Allied forces would obtain overwhelmingly local superiority, and this would largely increase the odds of Allies. However, the terrain and infrastructure of this theater would not facilitate the maneuver of large forces. It might be detrimental to the preparation of subsequent offensive from this area. On the contrary, this situation also limited enemy's reinforcement. Although this COA might not yield decisive effect at the first phase, but the success of it could achieve the goals of assisting Russia, crippling enemy's strength and keeping enemy's separation. After occupying Italy, the Allies could immediately threaten the Germany's strategic flank, as well as could make a penetration between France and Germany. This COA also would provide the benefit of preventing the bulk of East European countries from falling into the Russia's talon.

COA-3 could be conducted either from the northern or southern

regions of U.S.S.R. and at the earliest time. This COA could avoid the risk of amphibious landing and thoroughly concentrate the Allied strength. It also would facilitate the West Allied influences to enter into all European and Middle East countries. Nonetheless, the COA in northern Russia had the longest lines of supply and shipping, the German U-boats would be a very large threat of this COA. The COA in southern Russia should cross Iran or Turkey, the terrain of these two countries would seriously limit the movement of armored forces. Therefore, this COA might be logistically unfeasible. Furthermore, the Russia's unstable attitude would greatly decrease the effect of cooperation.

d. Decision on the foregoing alternatives, in R.O.C. thinking process would defer from the U.S. As for achieving the decisive effect, COA-1 would be the best; From the viewpoint of earliest action, COA-2 would be the best. However, both these two COAs had some risks and limitations. What the U.S. (Allies) needed was a COA which could create an advantageous situation and maintain long-term interests. Therefore, COA-2 would be the most optimal COA. The Allies should conduct an immediate offensive from the Mediterranean. After eliminating Italy and crippling German war capability, the Allies should develop the advantageous strategic situation for sequential offensive into Germany. Moreover, the success of

this COA would depend on the deception to make Germany believe that the Allied main offensive would come from West Europe.

2. The decision of "Invading Japanese Homeland":

This decision also could illustrate the differences in the thinking process. The following presents a R.O.C. perspective of strategic assessment, objectives determination, course of actions and decision.

a. Strategic Environment Assessment (based on the situation at the end of 1944) involves global situation, national interests, and national power.

(I) Global situation:

Germany had been pressed to the verge of defeat, her collapse would come very soon; Japanese armies were still fighting desperately, it seemed to defeat Japan would yet need considerable efforts. Nevertheless, Japan is a island state and meager in strategic resources, and her armies were extensively separate in Asia-Pacific countries and islands. So Japan had extreme reliance on lines of supply.

China has huge territory and population, giving her a tremendous potential in the future. China long suffering war, experienced a rise in Chinese Communist activities. Therefore, China would have a period of instability in the post-war.

Russia also has vast territory and plenty of resources. After gripping

Eastern and Central European countries, Russia's power had been greatly enhanced. It was obviously that Stalin's rapacity would not be contented.

The expansion of Asian countries would be the next objective of the Russia.

(II) National interests and threats:

One peaceful and stable world still would be the vital national interests of U.S. However, Germany and Japan were threatening the U.S. vital interests, but their defeats would be inevitable. Russia's attack against Japan could share some burden of Allies, but the price would be the occupation of Manchuria, or perhaps Red China and Korea. This would extend communism power into Asian countries. So Russia would become the greatest threat of the U.S. in the post-war era.

(III) National power:

The U.S. war potential had been adequately mobilized, she had enough capabilities to defeat Germany and Japan. However, if Russia's power was continually increased, the U.S. would be very difficult to counter balance.

b. Objectives determination:

Using a R.O.C. thinking process would differ. The defeats of
Germany and Japan still were the prior objectives of the U.S. To prevent the
expansion of Soviet power would be the next significant objective of the

U.S. For achieving these objectives the U.S. (Allies) should (1) promptly rush forward in Germany to meet the Russians, (2) utterly cut the Japanese lines of supply and swiftly compress the envelopment toward her homeland, (3) positively liberate Eastern and Central European countries from being ruled by communist authorities. (4) cautiously prevent the Russians into other countries.

c. Course of actions (COAs) evaluation:

Based on a R.O.C. perspective, for the defeat of Japan, the U.S. (Allies) COAs would include (1) invading Japanese homeland and appealing for Russian assistance, (2) blockading Japanese lines of communication and bombing her homeland. These two COAs could be evaluated as follows:

COA-1 could thoroughly destroy Japanese war-making capabilities.

However, this COA would pay very expensive cost which included high casualties and the Russia's occupation of Manchuria. As a result, the lack of forward bases would cause this COA wait for the time that Russia could totally control the coastline of Manchuria or delivered from long distance bases. It would be infeasible both in time and space.

COA-2 should take an uncertain time to smash Japanese will of war, but it could largely reduce the Allied casualties. Since Japanese lines of supply had been cut and her armies were isolated in separate regions, they

could not support one another. Therefore, the Allies could only concentrate its efforts to attack/bomb Japanese homeland. This situation could intensify the pressure on Japan and prompt her to go the dead end more quickly.

Moreover, this COA could prevent the Russia's further expansion in Asia, it would benefit to gain the long-term interests of the U.S.

d. Decision of these two COAs: COA-1 apparently had strategic advantage, but its latent disadvantage would be much more serious.

Moreover, the intolerable cost would be its fatal defect. COA-2 might need longer time to accomplish it; however, low casualties and high odds made COA-2 more feasible. Since this COA could promote long-term interests, so it would be the more optimal COA. The U.S. (Allies) should thoroughly destroy Japanese Navy and intensively bomb her homeland. Meanwhile, the West Allies should refuse Russia's request of entering into Manchuria and immediately prevent Russia's expansion. Nevertheless, the action of invading Japanese homeland or her occupied islands should be prepared, in order to keep strategic flexibility.

V. Recommendation

After depicting and exemplifying, we may realize that thinking process is like a framework, which could effectively shape our thinking and further control the strategy. However, the same framework used by diverse persons might generate various strategies. Thus, we should not only focus on thinking process itself, but also should emphasize the importance of the approach to use it. For the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of thinking process, I would like herein to suggest some recommendations to the U.S. and my country.

A. Foresight:

One Chinese ancient sage said: "If the state has no long-term concern, she must suffer short-term hardship." Strategic leaders are responsible for making significant decisions, which would surely influence the long-term future of their country. In above exemplification, we may find that the U.S. strategic leaders did not foresee the interests and threats of post-war.

Consequently, the U.S. won the war but lost peace, she had to deal with the confrontation of communists in the post-war. On the contrary, Stalin knew what he wanted, and he got it. The U.S.S.R. communized Eastern Europe and many Asian countries, her influences even stretched into many countries of Third World. Therefore, long-term national interests should be carefully considered in thinking process. The foresight on future situation and latent threats would be the important thinking step for protecting long-term interests.

B. Flexibility:

Uncertainty and complexity are the inherent characteristics of strategic thinking. For the purpose of controlling initiative and freedom of action, thinking process must keep a sufficient space of flexibility. The lesson we learned from above exemplification, the U.S. strategic leaders knew that an immediate action was very important to Allies, and it was impossible to conduct the decisive offensive (cross Channel) before 1943. However, they constantly insisted their strategic thinking of a decisive attack. Though the U.S. finally accomplished the offensive, it was conducted too late. The effect of this offensive might not be as significant as expected. One Soviet text book (Lyons, cited below) described the cross-Channel invasion²²:

"In June, 1944, when it had become obvious that the Soviet Union was capable of defeating Hitler's Germany with her forces alone, England and the USA opened the Second Front."

Therefore, thinking process should be based on the varieties of strategic environment, then adjust its priorities of considerations (criteria for evaluation). By so doing, we may generate a more flexible strategy and create new opportunities from controlling current opportunities.

C. Consistency:

Consistency is the linkage of different strategic levels. Every strategic level should be able to direct subordinate strategies and support the superior

strategy. If the national level strategy could not well define objectives, this may result the using of military power that is incompatible with the national objectives. If military level strategy could not recognize the national policy, this also may cause disconnection between military strategy and national interests. For example, before the decision of invading Japanese homeland, U.S. military leaders might not have perfect understanding on national interests. Consequently, they selected to appeal to Russian assistance for achieving the invasion. However, Japan was finally defeated by strategic (atomic) bombing, and Russia had never really fought with against Japan. Therefore, thinking process should concern the critical interrelationships between its upper and lower level, and regularly check whether its outcome could match other strategies.

VI. Conclusion

Thinking is the stream of consciousness, we may purposefully organize its process for solving problems and making decisions. Thinking process is a framework which could shape our thinking procedure and approach.

Thinking process at different levels might have different aspects and steps to consider. The exemplification in this paper illustrates how the thinking process influences a strategic decision. When applying thinking process, we

process influences a strategic decision. When applying thinking process, we should foresee the evaluation of future situation, keep flexibility and make consistent with relative policies and strategies. One proper thinking process would benefit all political and military leaders/planners.

I cherish this opportunity for research about thinking process. After writing this paper, I was able to enhance my understanding of thinking process. It is not only important to promote my military knowledge, but also very helpful to increase my thinking effectiveness.

Endnotes

- 1. John Dewey, How We Think (D. C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1933) 3
- 2. John Chaffee, Thinking Critically (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston) 1
- 3.Colonel Joseph R. Cerami, <u>War, National Policy & Strategy</u>, (Carlisle, PA. USAWC, Department od National Security and Strategy, <u>Core Curriculum</u>, Course 2, Academic Year 1996), 111
- 4. <u>Army Operational Directive Large Forces Command</u>, (Taiwan, The ROC Military Publication, 1989), and <u>Army Forces Command Strategic Volume</u>, (Taiwan, The ROC Military Publication, 1975).
- 5. Colonel William W. Mendel and Lieutenant Colonel Floyd T. Banks, Jr. Campaign Planning, (Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 4 January 1988), 13, 96
- 6.Colonel William W. Mendel and Lieutenant Colonel Floyd T. Banks, Jr. Campaign Planning, (Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 4 January 1988), Appendix C Planning Process Flow Charts, C-11
- 7.Kent Roberts Greenfield, <u>American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration</u>, (Westport Connecticut, Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1979). 4-10.
- These eight decisions included:
- a. First: the decision that the overriding aim of the coalition would be the complete defeat of its enemies.
- b. Second: the decision of the United States that Germany was the Number One enemy.
- c. Third: the decision of Britain and the United States in July, 1942, to invade North Africa.
- d. Fourth: the decision of the Western allies to give a combined bomber offensive directed at vital of the Germany.
- e. Fifth: the decision to allow a limited offensive in the Pacific Ocean Areas.
- g. Sixth: the decision to launch an amphibious offensive through the Central Pacific in 1944, simultaneously with drive toward the Philippines.
- h. Seventh: the decision of combined arms across the English Channel.
- i. Eighth: the decision that an invasion of the Japanese homeland.
- 8.Gordon A. Harrison, United States Army in World War II, <u>The European Theater of Operations, Cross-Channel Attack</u>, (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1951) 6

- 9.J. R. M. Butler, <u>Grand Strategy</u>, Volume III, Part II, (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964) 564
- 10.Gordon A. Harrison, United States Army in World War II, <u>The European Theater of Operations, Cross-Channel Attack</u>, (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1951) 35
- 11.Gordon A. Harrison, United States Army in World War II, <u>The European Theater of Operations, Cross-Channel Attack</u> (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1951). 30.
- "The President asked for study of GYMNAST as the next most desirable operation. General Marshall still reluctant to commit U.S. strategy irrevocably to the Mediterranean."
- 12.J. R. M. Butler, <u>Grand Strategy</u>, Volume III, Part II, (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964) 565
- 13. Winston S. Churchill, <u>The Grand Alliance</u>, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950) 456-462
- 14.Gordon A. Harrison, United States Army in World War II, <u>The European Theater of Operations, Cross-Channel Attack</u> (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1951). 123
- 15.Richard M. Leighton, "Overlord Versus the Mediterranean at the Cairo-Tehran Conference." <u>Command Decision</u>, (Washington, D.C. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960) 255
- 16.Kent Roberts Greenfield, <u>American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration</u>, (Westport Connecticut, Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1979). 13
- 17.Kent Roberts Greenfield, <u>American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration</u>, (Westport Connecticut, Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1979). 12
- 18.Gordon A. Harrison, United States Army in World War II, <u>The European Theater of Operations, Cross-Channel Attack</u> (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1951). 12
- 19.J. R. M. Butler, <u>Grand Strategy</u>, Volume III, Part II, (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964) 565

- 20.Richard M. Leighton, "Overlord Versus the Mediterranean at the Cairo-Tehran Conference." <u>Command Decision</u>, (Washington, D.C. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960) 255
- 21.Kent Roberts Greenfield, <u>American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration</u>, (Westport Connecticut, Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1979). 21
- 22.BIB File, Note: Eastern Invasion of Germany?, USAMHI, RefBranch dv Oct. 81